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Recent contributions to the organizational literature see the radical subjectivist and 
disequilibrium framework of Ludwig Lachmann as providing a suitable foundation 
for strategic entrepreneurial studies, in that his approach seeks independence from 
conventional equilibrium-based reasoning. In a Lachmannian spirit, this article 
suggests that strategizing can fruitfully be viewed as choices made by the 
entrepreneur in terms of the organization’s constituent resources, activities and 
routines together with their recombinations and complexifications. Cast in a general, 
disequilibrium setting, the strategic goals that guide the organizational entrepreneur’s 
strategizing can be formulated in terms of the construction and capture of resource 
complementarities, the pursuit of increasing returns through activities reconfiguration; 
and the generation of learning and dynamic capabilities through reconfiguration of 
routines. Once formulated in this way, the strategizing issues may be seen to make 
sense not just in the comparative static and imperfect equilibrium frameworks within 
which they have hitherto been posed, but in a more general dynamic and 
disequilibrium setting that corresponds to the real conditions in which firms are 
required to make entrepreneurial decisions. The simplified framework offers some 
hope for overcoming the balkanization of management scholarship that is so widely 
deplored. 
 





Lachmannian Insights into Strategic Entrepreneurship: Resources, 
Activities and Routines in a Disequilibrium World  
 
 
Chiles, Bluedorn and Gupta (2007) in a stimulating contribution to Organization 
Studies challenge organization scholars to be bold, and to think in ways that lie 
outside the narrow confines of frameworks that derive explicitly or implicitly from 
equilibrium-based economics and its extremely restrictive assumptions. They take up 
the challenge issued by Gartner et al (1992) to ‘borrow boldly’ and do so by 
proffering the framework developed by the Austrian economist Ludwig Lachmann as 
one that has much to commend it as a potential foundation for entrepreneurial and 
organizational studies. Lachmann is a suitable candidate, Chiles et al argue, because 
he offers a theory of capital structure for the economy as a whole that is grounded in 
non-orthodox disequilibrium assumptions. In Lachmann’s world, the capital structure 
of the economy is its defining characteristic at any moment in time, and it is being 
continuously made over, through combinations and recombinations of capital goods 
driven by entrepreneurs who, in seeking to put into effect their production plans, are 
forced to make adjustments as the plans prove to be mutually incompatible. It is the 
capital gains and losses derived from the implementation of these production plans 
that drive the economy, and it is the mutual incompatibility and incommensurability 
of these disparate plans that is, according to Lachmann, the ultimate source of 
disequilibrium within which all firms are forced to conduct their affairs. Ultimately, 
organizations derive their strategic rationale from this ever-shifting capital structure of 
the business system. 
 Such an interpretation of Lachmann for an organizational and strategic 
audience has much to commend it. In this article I take up the challenge issued by 
Chiles, Bluedorn and Gupta (2007) (henceforth CBG) and take their argument further. 
They rest their case by alluding to a Lachmannian account of changing capital 
structure, driven by entrepreneurs’ search for ways of building complementarities 
between capital goods as a potential source of profit, as one that provides a suitably 
coherent framework for strategic entrepreneurial studies. I suggest that they stop too 
short. Lachmann indeed gives us a convincing account of the entrepreneurial 
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refashioning of the capital structure of the economy through combinations and 
recombinations of resources. But what of the revenue-generating activities that must 
be based on these resource combinations, and the ‘competitive forces’ that operate on 
these activities, as they stretch across the economy in various kinds of value chains? 
Surely this too has to have a place in a general and coherent account of strategic 
entrepreneurship. And what, further, of the firm’s operating routines, that are set in 
place and then monitored and adjusted as needed by managers hired for the purpose? 
Surely these routines, and the organizational learning or capabilities that they embody, 
must also form part of a coherent and general account of organizational and strategic 
entrepreneurship studies.   
 In this paper I build on CBG in offering a framework for discussing the 
strategic entrepreneurial dynamics of the firm in a thoroughly Lachmannian spirit but 
in a way that goes beyond Lachmann’s original contributions and seeks to engage 
with organizational strategy theories as currently conceived. CBG are concerned to 
establish that their Lachmannian framework is one that does not derive its legitimacy 
from the equilibrium-based assumptions of neoclassical economics, and is indeed best 
formulated in a disequilibrium setting that is consistent with real conditions in the 
economy.i Likewise I too wish to insist that a thorough and coherent foundation for 
strategic entrepreneurship must stand on its own feet, as it were, and not carry over 
restrictive assumptions from equilibrium-based economics. But such a framework 
must engage with what are widely perceived to be dominant approaches to strategy 
today, namely the Resource-based view (RBV) and the Porter ‘competitive forces’ 
view.  
In this article I argue that a framework that is Lachmannian in spirit can 
indeed be couched in entirely disequilibrium terms, and provide a generalized 
alternative to the existing strategy frameworks that are comparative static rather than 
dynamic in spirit, and apply only in very restrictive settings of imperfect equilibrium. 
The RBV views the firm’s strategic goals as capturing rents based on the scarcity of 
resources acquired or controlled, while the Porter competitive forces view sees these 
goals in terms of the firm capturing monopoly rents based on the ‘scarcity’ of 
interfirm rivalry in the industry. The two views are essentially duals or complements 
of each other, in the sense that they view the same firm and its economic location 
through two different lenses, namely resources and activities (as done originally by 
Wernerfelt (1984)). But the search for profit is surprisingly absent from these 
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accounts; firms are instead depicted as seeking ‘rents’ – a concept that makes sense 
only at an imperfect equilibrium. In the RBV, firms are seeking Ricardian rents based 
on imperfect markets for resources and resulting resource scarcity, while in the Porter 
view firms are seeking monopoly rents based on imperfect markets for goods and 
services where strategy is conceived as a way of maintaining such imperfections (such 
as through erecting barriers to entry). There must surely be a more general and 
intuitively straightforward way of characterizing the strategizing behavior of firms in 
the real, disequilibrium conditions of the business world.  
 In the spirit of CBG, and in the spirit of Lachmann, I suggest that an 
alternative starting point for strategic theorizing is available that departs from the 
standard assumptions of imperfect equilibrium that we find in mainstream approaches 
to strategy. Such an alternative account can be framed in terms of the elemental 
categories of business enterprise – resources, activities and the routines that connect 
them – and in the way that entrepreneurs strategically manipulate these organizational 
categories in the search for profits. From this starting point, I outline a framework for 
strategizing couched in terms of these fundamental categories, giving them suggested 
definitions that not only make sense in themselves but also in terms of their mutual 
interaction and interdependence. Goals for strategizing associated with each of these 
elemental categories can then be framed – goals which are oriented towards the 
earning of profit, and where the profit can be earned away from equilibrium (the 
general case) by firms taking entrepreneurial initiatives in what Denrell, Fang and 
Winter (2003) term ‘strategic opportunities’. I suggest, along with CBG and in the 
spirit of Lachmann, that disequilibrium is the setting for strategizing and 
organizational reasoning that offers insights not available with the more restrictive 
assumptions that have been carried over from economics. The framework offered, in 
that its categories are common across different disciplines like marketing or supply 
chain management, might also help to overcome the continuing and deplorable 
balkanization of management (Hambrick 2004).  
Language is important, and the terms used carry coded messages. This paper 
deploys language from three fields of study, namely neoclassical economics, 
conventional strategy and organization studies. The language of economics turns on 
efficiency questions judged at a point of equilibrium (indeed, perfect equilibrium). 
The view of the firm in the neoclassical world banishes uncertainties and matters of 
judgment; it has no place for entrepreneurship. The language of strategy (at least in its 
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mainstream Resource-based and competitive forces versions) turns on exploiting 
market inefficiencies, whether barriers to entry in product markets, or barriers in 
resource markets (such as inimitability). The view of the firm in this case is to see it 
as an instrument for exploiting such inefficiencies and capturing rents (which are 
earnings above normal at a point of imperfect equilibrium); again, a view that is 
Ricardian in spirit and hostile to entrepreneurial imagination. Then there is the 
language of organization studies, which ever since the rise of the behavioral theory of 
the firm has turned on constructs such as bounded rationality, imperfect 
environmental matching and unresolved conflict (Cyert and March 1963/1992: 215). 
There are no assumptions of equilibrium – perfect or imperfect – underpinning this 
language (March 2007). Three sets of terms, three languages – all developing in 
separate journals, and building walls of mutual incomprehensibility. But management 
as a discipline calls for a comprehension of problems that span all three languages. 
That is why I have to use language from all three areas in this paper, because the aim 
is to build an organizational account of the firm, in the spirit of Lachmann (and the 
Austrians generally), that can demonstrate how strategizing can generate original 
profits by entrepreneurial recombinations of resources, activities and routines at the 
firm level – and to contrast this with the account offered by neoclassical economics 
and with that offered by conventional strategy discourse. Our framework for 
strategizing should be consistent with a view of a dynamic, restless, growth-driven 
industrial economy rather than a pre-industrial economy that is trapped within 




The starting point for any general account of strategizing, viewed as an alternative to 
conventional neoclassical discourse (focused on the point of perfect equilibrium) and 
as an alternative to conventional strategy discourse (focused on the region of 
imperfect equilibrium, where rents can be earned) has to be entrepreneurship. It is the 
entrepreneur who builds new organizations. Real entrepreneurs in real settings work 
with uncertainty as to the ‘facts’ of economic life; they make judgments, guesses, and 
formulate hypotheses based on their expectations. They seek to anticipate events 
before there are adequate data available. They test hypotheses (in this case market 
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hypotheses) in more or less the same way that scientists test hypotheses in the 
laboratory (Harper 1996). They engage in investments that mobilize resources and 
reconfigure activities. They generate gains and incur losses. 
Finally, after many years of neglect (Low and Macmillan 1988) the field of 
entrepreneurial studies is starting to blossom. The earlier work in the Austrian 
tradition of authors such as Kirzner is now joined by studies that link entrepreneurship 
with strategy viewed as a dynamic version of the RBV in a setting of Austrian 
theories of capital (e.g. Foss and Ishikawa 2007); with capital theory and the economy 
viewed in terms of heterogeneous capital (Foss et al 2007); with processes of 
discovery and creativity (Kor et al 2007); with ‘pattern matching’ between market 
process economics and principles of TQM (Chiles and Choi 2000); and with the 
beginnings of an Austrian theory of the firm as an alternative to the neoclassical 
theory (Lewin and Phelan 1999). A new journal on ‘strategic entrepreneurship’ is now 
being published, and papers that seek to engage with this as a new field are starting to 
appear – where the field is viewed as extending to encompass domains such as 
external network formation, organizational learning and innovation (Hitt et al 2001); 
entrepreneurial mindset, entrepreneurial culture and leadership (Ireland et al 2003); 
and the nature, discovery and exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunities (Companys 
and McMullen 2007). Foss et al (2008) for example develop an argument that a 
consistent application of subjectivism helps to reconcile entrepreneurship theory with 
the strategic management literature – and particularly with the resource-based view of 
the firm.  
There is already a tendency visible in this new field of strategic 
entrepreneurship to view entrepreneurial initiative in terms of judgment as an act in 
itself – rather than as the prelude to making investments, which must remain as the 
core of a field self-defined as the study of entrepreneurship. Shane and Venkataraman 
(2000) for example outline their version of a framework that should guide research on 
entrepreneurship, using as a definition of this field that it is ‘the scholarly examination 
of how, by whom, and with what effects opportunities to create future goods and 
services are discovered, evaluated, and exploited’ (2000: 218). They argue that the 
field involves study of opportunities and their sources; processes of discovery and 
evaluation; and the set of individuals who discover, evaluate and exploit such 
opportunities. But it is striking that this list leaves out (at least does not mention 
explicitly) the study of how businesses are actually founded and how they grow; how 
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they are diversified; how the entrepreneurial process fits into the wider processes of 
the economy, and how it meshes with any conception of strategizing. All of these 
elements, I suggest, must be part of any comprehensive framework that captures the 
role of entrepreneurial behavior in generating strategic variety and in driving the 
business system along new pathways. Such an approach might not capture all aspects 
of entrepreneurial endeavor (e.g. the creation of non-innovative small businesses that 
compete in local niches) but it should capture the cases that make a difference.  
For their part, Foss et al (2008) propose a view of strategic entrepreneurship in 
a subjectivist context as a creative team act in which heterogeneous mental models 
interact to create and arrange resources to produce a collective output that is creatively 
superior to individual output. While these authors make a careful distinction between 
entrepreneurship as judgment and entrepreneurship as alertness, both discussed in the 
Austrian tradition, they appear to eliminate from their strategic perspective any 
entrepreneurial fashioning of fresh revenue-generating activities based on the 
resources assembled, or the routines needed to link such activities with the underlying 
resource bundle. In a comprehensive approach to strategic entrepreneurship, all these 
elements, I submit, need to be seen to be in play. 
 Finally there is an emerging tendency in the new field of strategic 
entrepreneurship (associated with scholars at the Fisher College of Business at Ohio 
State University) to view entrepreneurship itself as a resource, and able thereby to 
earn entrepreneurial rents. Here the argument goes that entrepreneurial initiative is 
associated with some identifiable ‘resources’ such as entrepreneurial cognition (the 
recognition of opportunities) and entrepreneurial resource-combining (the exercise of 
combinative capabilities), brought to the firm by the entrepreneur, and which then 
earn entrepreneurial rents. According to Alvarez and Busenitz (2001: 759) if the 
insights and decisions reached with entrepreneurial cognition “are indeed rare, if they 
are difficult to imitate, and if the generated ideas are exploited by the entrepreneurs, 
then these entrepreneurial insights and decisions are a resource that can potentially 
lead to a competitive advantage”. There is an infinite regress involved in such an 
argument: if this kind of ‘entrepreneurial cognition’ is indeed a resource, then it can 
be offered by its owner to an entrepreneur building a business and as such can attract 
a rent. So there will have to be another entrepreneur B taking advantage of A’s 
‘entrepreneurial cognition’ – and if entrepreneur B also displays entrepreneurial 
cognition, then his or her cognition will be available to be used by entrepreneur C – 
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and so on and on we go, in an infinite regress. This is an inescapable implication of 
characterizing entrepreneurial characteristics as resources which can earn rents. This 
is why we need a definition of resources that enables entrepreneurs to combine and 
recombine them in a way that builds on complementarities and thereby generates 
(original) profits. If we take such an approach, then entrepreneurship itself cannot be 
a resource. 
In this paper I target these gaps and inconsistencies in the literature that may be 
defined by a concern with entrepreneurship as going beyond matters of knowledge 
and judgment to engage with the real investments made by entrepreneurs as they build 
firms with distinctive characteristics. In the spirit of Lachmann (and of the Austrian 
traditional generally), the approach I take in this paper is to provide a strategic 
account of investments made not in terms of capital and labor but in terms of the three 
elemental categories of business enterprise, namely resources, activities and their 
linking routines. Entrepreneurial dynamics in this sense will focus on the combination 
and recombination of the firm’s constituent resources, activities and routines, as 
entrepreneurs develop investment plans based on these elemental categories. In this 
way, I build a strategic counterpart to the economic account of entrepreneurship 
offered by economists (even enlightened economists) such as Bianchi and Henrekson 
(2005).ii  
Drawing these threads together, we may define strategic entrepreneurship as 
the activity that drives the economy in new directions, through recombination of 
resources, activities and routines by firms, and the entrepreneur as the economic agent 
who in principle lacks resources (but knows where to find them), who becomes aware 
of opportunities that can be turned into profit, and acts to realize these opportunities 
through resource mobilization and activation in the pursuit of profit. The capitalist 
institution that supports entrepreneurship is credit, which enables resource-poor 
entrepreneurs to mobilize business assets and mount challenges to incumbents. This is 
an approach to entrepreneurship that is entirely consistent with Lachmann’s vision of 
subjective expectations and imagination relating to resource combination and 
recombination leading to successive capital restructuring at the level of the economy. 
The goal at the level of the firm is entrepreneurial profit, which may be viewed as the 
prime motivator of strategizing behavior, and indeed the driving force behind 
economic dynamics. How then are profits earned? 
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Profits are earned in disequilibrium 
 
Neoclassical economic discourse never asks where profits come from; they are simply 
‘earned’ by factors of production and the focus is on their efficient distribution. 
Conventional strategy for its part never employs the term profit and instead talks of 
rents, which can only be earned (by definition) at an imperfect equilibrium, through 
various kinds of market imperfections. By contrast, we want an account of 
strategizing by the entrepreneurial firm that is focused on how the firm may create 
original profits. These can then be distributed to other economic agents, through 
strategies of imitation and emulation. Conventional approaches to strategy, such as the 
RBV and Porter framework, sidestep the issue by focusing on rents rather than profits. 
Perhaps without being aware of the fact, this focus on rents constrains these 
frameworks to evaluate strategy in the restrictive setting of imperfect equilibrium, and 
to discuss strategizing in terms of market imperfections rather than the firms’ own 
actions oriented towards destabilizing the plans launched by others. If profits instead 
are to be the focus, then there are two aspects to consider – earnings above costs 
incurred during production of goods or services, and capital gains or losses. For the 
former, we can do no better than go back to the theory developed by the great 
American economist, Frank Knight. For the latter, we shall take up the story as 
bequeathed by Lachmann. 
 
Knightian profit 
In his 1921 book, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, and subsequent elaborations, Knight 
introduced a fundamental distinction between risk, which can be observed and, at 
least in principle, insured against, and uncertainty, which cannot be estimated 
according to a known probability distribution, and can only be resolved by taking 
some real-world action. He then linked these distinctions to a conception of profit 
which he defined as a pure ‘residual’ income after all contractual payments for factors 
utilized have been paid. This cleared up the endless debates of the 19th century over 
whether ‘profit’ should include interest, or wages of management, or a return to a 
fourth factor of production. Knight then identified residual earnings with the 
irreducible uncertainty that attaches to every business enterprise. This cleared away 
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previous confusion over whether profits arose only as a result of dynamics or 
innovation (the Schumpeterian position), or could result from disturbances of the 
price system. Knight made it clear that insofar as risks can be insured, they do not 
enter into profits, and insofar as the services of factors can be paid at a contractual rate 
(i.e. agreed in advance) they cannot share in the residual. Therefore, the profit as 
residual accrues to the bearer of uncertainty, the entrepreneur, considered either as an 
individual or as a firm. Contractual incomes can mitigate the effects of risk, but not of 
uncertainty. Thus Knight reconciled his vision with neowalrasian orthodoxy, which 
holds that at equilibrium, all excess earnings, i.e. non-contractual earnings, are 
reduced to zero. 
Knight was at pains to develop a theory of profits that survives a rigorous 
definition of perfectly competitive equilibrium (and can operate with efficient 
markets), and makes space for entrepreneurship which is otherwise banished from the 
neowalrasian system.iii  In Knight’s scheme, simple (or simplistic) that it is, 
entrepreneurs gather together as many resources as they need, and undertake 
production of goods and services, from which they generate revenues.  After paying 
all contractual terms for these (in present or future terms and on efficient factor 
markets) they keep the residual, either positive (they are in business) or negative (they 
declare bankruptcy). This is the Knightian definition of ‘pure profits’ as residual; it is 
the counterpart of Net Present Value in financial management, which is likewise a 
residual concept. The point is that at perfectly competitive equilibrium (PCE), such 
pure profits or NPVs sum to zero. Therefore, as Knight himself says (1942), positive 
profits must be earned in disequilibrium. This is the region of economic space where 
entrepreneurs flourish using their imagination, their bounded rationality and making 
judgments as to what might be the ‘facts’. It is the region where we might say that 
‘strategic opportunities’ may be created and seized (Denrell, Fang and Winter 2003).   
 
Lachmannian capital gains 
But capital gains and losses are just as important a source of profit for entrepreneurs 
(Jacobides and Winter 2007). Here we find that Lachmann offers great intuition, in his 
idea that capital gains and losses at the level of the firm are associated in aggregate 
with changes in the economy’s capital structure. Lachmann is at pains to call the 
object of this activity ‘a conception of capital as a structure’ (1947: 109) as opposed 
to a conception of a capital stock, because he wants to insist that there is no objective 
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measure of this structure. It is the outcome of the various investment plans launched 
by competing entrepreneurs, who will be modifying their proposals as they become 
aware of each others’ initiatives. It is this incommensurability of capital investment 
projects (production plans) that is the fundamental Lachmannian insight. It is only at a 
(fictional) equilibrium that all such projects are made commensurable and measurable. 
And at such a fictional equilibrium, Knight adds the further necessary insight that 
profits are reduced to zero.  
 So Lachmann and Knight provide us with the basic framework for the 
strategizing entrepreneurial firm. The entrepreneur is looking to invest in some novel 
activity (or in imitation of some other firm’s activity) and does so by combining 
existing resources into some new package that is deemed (or judged) by the 
entrepreneur as likely to be able to add value in the new situation. There is no way of 
confirming the calculations involved other than through testing the new combination 
and its products (goods or services) in the marketplace, against those produced by 
other entrepreneurs’ combinations. Harper (1996) captures this idea in the proposition 
that every business venture is a test of a market conjecture.  
 
The Lachmann framework: Capital structure and complementarities 
 
 CBG and other contributors such as Lewin (1997) give us an excellent launching pad 
for reformulating organizational studies and entrepreneurial studies in a 
disequilibrium, Lachmannian setting where the concern is with how entrepreneurs 
configure and reconfigure the economy’s capital structure through combination and 
recombination of their firms’ capital goods. Lachmann introduced as the key concept 
of capital structure the idea of complementarity, where the idea is that capital goods 
can be considered as complements in a disequilibrium setting if they fit together in a 
coherent production plan. This is a quite different and richer notion than we see 
referred to by complementarity vs. substitutability in equilibrium-based 
microeconomics.  
 Reformulating the terms used, we may state this insight as one where 
entrepreneurial firms are seeking out possibilities to use resources and repackaging 
them in the search for ways of building complementarities, or synergies. Take as an 
example an investment bank that buys various small telecommunications firms (for 
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example, having licences covering different parts of the spectrum or covering 
different regions) and packaging them together as a coherent operating entity and 
selling it to the highest bidder. This is a profitable enterprise for the investment bank 
because here the whole is worth much more than the sum of its parts -- precisely 
because of the complementarities achieved (or synergies). A single firm can put this 
package to use much more effectively than a group of small firms struggling with 
their separate resource bundles. So value has been created by the repackaging of these 
resource bundles – or rather, potential value has been created, since it now has to be 
put to use in the form of revenue-generating activities. And this might be done well, 
or badly. But the point being made here is that the value of any resource combination 
is not determined objectively, but by the strategic and entrepreneurial (read: 
subjective) calculations made regarding the potential of the combination.iv  
Capital structure viewed at the level of the economy is a Lachmannian 
construct that is formulated deliberately as one that does not rest on any equilibrium 
assumptions. The capital structure of the economy is necessarily heterogeneous, in 
that it results from the (usually) conflicting and mutually effacing production plans of 
different entrepreneurs. By contrast the conception of capital as a stock carries the 
connotation that its value is being computed at the only point where this idea can 
make sense, namely at equilibrium. Note that capital structure refers to value, not to 
physical goods – but to a notion of value that cannot be determined, because it is 
created by incommensurable production plans and evaluation schemas of competing 
entrepreneurs. Here we see why Lachmann has fallen into disfavour, even amongst 
Austrian economists who see him as a dangerous radical opposing the Austrian 
orthodoxy of von Mises and his followers (e.g. Kirzner, Rothbard). The American 
exponent of Austrian economics, Rothbard, refers to those who subscribe to 
Lachmann’s ideas as being deluded by ‘Lachmannia’ (cited in Salerno 2002: 121). 
The reason is presumably that his radical subjectivism and his insistence that capital 
structure only makes sense in a setting of disequilibrium seems to sentence economics 
to a perpetual search for the unattainable.  
 What CBG invite us to do is to re-evaluate Lachmann from a fresh perspective, 
namely as providing a framework not for economics but for organizational and 
strategic studies, where we can make sense of entrepreneurial initiative – and, I would 
add, of strategic calculations by entrepreneurs. These are essentially – fundamentally 
– subjective in nature. There is no way that we can consider strategic decisions to be 
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determined; that would be to undermine their character as strategic, or entrepreneurial. 
If we pose a strategic framework as one that insists that firms will invest in an 
industry only if that industry reaches a certain level of profitability (which is the 
upshot of the industry profits vs. firm profits debate) then we are eliminating the very 
topic of our enquiry, namely how entrepreneurs reach and make subjective strategic 
decisions regarding their firms. A Lachmannian perspective on this process invites us 
to view the investment choices in terms of entrepreneurial imagination, creativity, the 
framing of expectations and the making of judgments – rather than as making choices 
from a well-defined set of technical and production options, where everything is clear 
and certain, as in the neoclassical fantasy world. 
 So while it may not be widely acknowledged, strategic management and 
organizational science are indeed the legitimate heirs of the subjectivist tradition in 
Austrian economics, and indeed (as emphasized by CBG) of the radical subjectivist 
tradition which insists that all strategizing choices are made in conditions of 
uncertainty (if not ignorance) and disequilibrium, and cannot in principle be given any 
objective evaluation. This is the position occupied and defended by Lachmann and it 
is reflected in some of the more sophisticated approaches to characterizing knowledge 
in organization studies (Whitley 2008). That is why we should all consider ourselves 
to be Lachmannians now –or, if you like, pace Rothbard, we are now all 
Lachmanniacs.  
 
Strategically building the firm 
 
In the spirit of CBG, let us take a Lachmannian perspective beyond his own concerns 
with capital structure, into the realm of strategic entrepreneurship and the construction 
of firms. This brings the focus onto the firm’s activities, where resources are put to 
use, and on the routines that are built to link resources with activities. The aim here is 
to build a picture of the firm in terms of the elements that are under the direct strategic 
control of the entrepreneur, and to do so in a way that casts strategizing in a light that 
is fundamentally different from that which informs the neoclassical picture as well as 
the conventional strategy picture. My goals are threefold: first, to build a plausible 
strategic account of the process, by interfacing with existing strategy accounts based 
on resources, activities and routines (embodying dynamic capabilities); second, to 
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demonstrate how such an account dispenses with the assumptions forced by 
neoclassical economics’ obsession with equilibrium; and third, to link such an account 
with Austrian insights into market process, disequilibrium and Lachmann’s ideas 
concerning heterogeneous capital structure subject to constant change under the 
impact of entrepreneurial calculation. The basic idea is to transpose Lachmann’s 
constructs such as production plans, incommensurability and aggregate capital 
structure that is necessarily heterogeneous into the strategizing language of choices 
made with respect to resources, activities and routines, all of which are under direct 
entrepreneurial control and whose recombinations, carried out in conditions of 
disequilibrium, can generate original profits. It is the mind of the entrepreneur that 
brings these elemental business categories to life, and which sets them in motion. 
 
Resources 
Let us agree to view resources as the ‘atoms’ of business, out of which enterprises, 
and ultimately the economy, are fashioned. Resources may be defined as the 
productive assets of firms, the means through which activities are accomplished. In 
the present setting, we may see resources as providing services to the firm, for 
payment of a contractual fee, implied or explicit. The resources are paid a fixed (or 
variable) sum – but it is up to the firm, i.e. its owner, to decide how best to employ the 
resources so acquired or accessed, to generate revenues through activities. It is the 
firm as a bundle of resources that is important for entrepreneurial decision-making, 
not the individual resources themselves; this is the essential Penrosean insight that 
appears to have been lost in recent RBV theorizing (Barney 1995). Original profits are 
earned by entrepreneurial recombinations of bundles of resources that capture 
complementarities, or synergies. 
Defined in this way, resources are strategic categories, not subject to any 
objective measurement as a bundle in the way that technologies and production 
functions may be captured – which is consistent with the ‘Austrian’ approach to 
strategy (Jacobson 1992; Roberts and Eisenhardt 2003). To continue with the telco 
example, the firm once repackaged must now formulate a set of revenue-generating 
activities to make use of the new bundle of resources, in such a way that is distinctive 
and can gain the firm a competitive advantage over other firms whose activities and 
resource are bundled in different ways. The firm might wish to offer a service that 
utilizes its own telecommunications technology bundle, and seek distinctiveness 
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through its pricing structure, or through combined billing across different services 
(covering for example land lines, mobile, voice and data). At the level of activities, 
which are the duals of resources, there are many ways to package services based on a 
given bundle of resources in order to generate revenues. This is the province of 
Lachmannian business plans and plan complementarity, at the firm level, and where 
the aggregate of the entrepreneurs’ firm-level decisions results in a given capital 
structure for the economy as a whole, subject to the entrepreneurial choices made. The 
point is that a given bundle of resources might be used in quite different ways by 
different entrepreneurs – an idea that Lachmann termed the multiple specificity of 
capital goods (Lewin 1999: 123). 
 How then are resources to be evaluated strategically? If the firm is evaluating 
resources one by one, then an evaluation may well be made in terms of whether the 
‘new’ resource is valuable, rare, inimitable or specific to the organization concerned 
(the VRIO criteria elaborated by Barney (1995)). But the firm may evaluate resources 
according to quite different criteria – as in the case of Micron and Samsung 
fashioning their entry into the semiconductor industry in the 1980s where resources 
were acquired externally and evaluated in terms of their maximum transferability and 
minimal rarity. In other words, the resources sought by these challenger firms were 
those that were most easily and cheaply available. These are quite different strategic 
criteria, such as might be employed by a firm pursuing a ‘fast followership’ strategy. 
So the criteria used for evaluation of resources individually will vary as a function of 
the strategy pursued. But if we turn instead to the bundle of resources, following the 
intuition of Lachmann and later of Penrose, then undoubtedly the firm aims to build a 
bundle that is valuable, rare and difficult to imitate. This is surely axiomatic. The real 
issue is how such a bundle is to be constructed. What needs to be added to these 
criteria is the point that the bundle must exhibit synergies or complementarities – 
capturing the idea that the firm assembled by the entrepreneur as a whole must be 
more valuable than the sum of its parts.  
 
Activities 
Resources are used to generate activities, which earn the firm revenues. Activities 
may thus be contrasted with resources in that they earn revenues, and are tracked on 
the firm’s income statement rather than its balance sheet. But just like aggregate 
capital structure, the income-generating structure of the economy is fashioned by 
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strategic choices made by entrepreneurs as they configure and reconfigure their firms’ 
activities, searching to generate efficiencies (as in Porter’s cost drivers) or build 
distinctiveness (as when promoting a new telco with some new billing procedure, 
utilizing say internet-based accounts). The outcome across the economy as a whole of 
the combination and recombination of activities is a series of value chains that criss-
cross the economy that we might term a heterogeneous activities structure (by analogy 
with Lachmann’s heterogeneous capital structure). In the early years of marketing 
theory Alderson (1965) came up with a beautiful term for these value chains or 
activity structures; he called them transvections. It is a term that should be revived, 
because it refers specifically to the world of strategy and organization and not to 
equilibrium-based economics. (It is close to Porter’s idea of a value chain, which 
takes his framework well beyond the original competitive forces framework, which is 
explicitly formulated in an equilibrium setting.) The Porter value chain is a cost 
concept as compared with the broader scope of the transvection.  
 In order to accentuate the strategic nature of entrepreneurial recombinations of 
activities, we need to be able to postulate a strategic goal for such activity 
recombinations – in a manner analogous to Lachmann’s goal of complementarity in 
relation to recombinations of resources. The most straight-forward way of doing so is 
to view activities recombination as being performed in pursuit of the creation and 
capture of increasing returns. Here again we find a source of profit that has been 
eliminated by neoclassical economics by assumption, by fiat, as something that won’t 
make sense at perfect equilibrium. Indeed the equations of the neoclassical system can 
only be solved, at equilibrium, by assuming constant returns to scale or diminishing 
returns. Increasing returns, as discussed by such leading economic mavericks as 
Buchanan and Yoon (1999) or Arthur (1996), create problems for the smooth set of 
equations. But what might be a problem for a neoclassical economist can be viewed as 
a source of profit for a real entrepreneur. The creation and capture of increasing 
returns from recombinations of revenue-generating activities may thus be viewed as a 
second source of original entrepreneurial profit. This emphasizes why both activities 
and resources need to be considered (as duals of each other) in any strategic 




In the spirit of Lachmann (via CBG) we can go one step further. In the real firm, there 
is a link between resources and activities. This link is created by management routines 
or business processes or ‘standard operating procedure’ – all phrases utilized in the 
behavioral theory of the firm and getting at the point that firms largely operate 
through routinized processes that connect resources with activities and control the 
activities once implemented. Like resources, routines can be purchased by an 
entrepreneur in a more or less standardized form (think of software packages for cost 
accounting and internal logistics control) and then progressively specialized and 
recombined, lending the firm strategic distinctiveness. Routines are widely viewed as 
the means through which firms interact with the world (Cohen et al 1996; Dosi et al 
2008). The process of improving routines, combining and recombining routines in 
acts of entrepreneurial imagination and management efficiency, can be captured in a 
construct of ‘organizational learning’ as the routines themselves become more 
effective, as is their deployment by the management of the firm. As the routines are 
improved, so the firm can be said to acquire increasingly sophisticated competences 
(Levitt and March 1988). The broader the range of competences, the greater may be 
said to be the firm’s dynamic capabilities (Teece, Pisano and Shuen 1997). Again the 
point here is that the neoclassical picture of the firm has no place for such learning 
effects, and so to focus on them as part of our picture of strategic entrepreneurial 
behavior is a way of emphasizing the distinctiveness of the strategic way of thinking. 
To focus on organizational learning is also a way of generating distinctiveness with 
respect to conventional approaches to strategy, where the focus is on firms’ 
exploitation of market inefficiencies rather than on capturing original profit 
opportunities generated by entrepreneurial initiatives such as recombination of 
routines. The outcome of such actions is what we might call a heterogeneous 
knowledge structure of the economy as a whole (or dynamic capabilities at both the 
firm and economy level). 
 
So in a Lachmannian spirit we have a picture of the entrepreneur making subjective 
evaluations as to the profit potential of recombinations of three fundamental entities 
found in the business system. The mind of the entrepreneur is itself primary: this is 
where all the imaginative projections and possible courses of action are first 
formulated, and where the elemental categories of resources, activities and routines 
are juggled. Let us trace through this threefold process. First the entrepreneur is 
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evaluating resources in the formulation of production plans – which when set against 
the production plans of other firms, all seeking to utilize the same or similar resources 
but packaging them in different ways, results in an economy-wide capital structure 
that is entirely heterogeneous, as Lachmann described it. The entrepreneurs are guided 
in their resource repackaging efforts by the possibilities of constructing and capturing 
complementarities – interpreted as coherences in production plans, or synergies. As 
such, they have no counterpart in the neoclassical world that considers matters only at 
the point of equilibrium. By assumption in neoclassical economics, all 
complementarities vanish at equilibrium, and only perfect substitutability prevails. In 
Lachmann’s own words: ‘In a homogenous aggregate each unit is a perfect substitute 
for every other unit, as drops of water are in a lake. Once we abandon the conception 
of capital as homogeneous, we should therefore be prepared to find less 
substitutability and more complementarity. There now emerges at the opposite pole, a 
conception of capital as structure, in which each capital good has a definite function 
and in which all such goods are complements’ (1947: 199). 
 Second, the entrepreneur will utilize this resource bundle to construct or put 
into effect activities that earn revenues. In the pursuit of this goal the firm configures 
and reconfigures its value chain – like an IKEA reconfiguring the furniture industry 
value chain to create a network of dedicated suppliers that can all jointly benefit from 
the resulting expansion in scale of production. The entrepreneur seeks distinctiveness 
in creating a structure of more complex activities created out of simpler activities, as 
described by Denrell Fang and Winter (2003). Entrepreneurial firms are guided in this 
process by the construction and pursuit of increasing returns – again a source of profit 
that is reduced to zero at the point of equilibrium, according to the assumptions of 
neoclassical economics, where only constant returns or diminishing returns prevail. 
The outcome of such strategizing at the level of the economy as a whole (and the 
counterpart to Lachmann’s capital structure) is a network of value chains, or 
heterogeneous activities structure, or what Alderson called transvections -- the 
‘threads’ that tie the economy together. 
 Third, the entrepreneur introduces management into the picture by linking the 
existing resource bundle to the chosen activities mix through a set of operating 
routines, which are formulated and monitored and adjusted by managers hired for the 
purpose. Entrepreneurs are again seen to be creating distinctiveness as they add their 
own complexity to the routines utilized, building them up in their own way to create 
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and capture advantages based on causal ambiguity (Reed and DeFilippi 1990), that is 
to say, based on asymmetries of information as to the source of value creation. The 
firm may thus be viewed as a bundle of routines as much as a bundle of resources 
(Penrose) or a bundle of activities (Alderson) – all three facets are needed in a 
complete strategic entrepreneurial account. And in disequilibrium the firms are guided 
in this process by the pursuit of organizational learning, i.e. by the building of 
organizational capabilities that dynamically embody the firm’s learning. This again is 
a source of original profit that has no counterpart in equilibrium-based economics – in 
that all forms of learning are assumed away in the neoclassical schema. The outcome 
of these firm-level entrepreneurial initiatives at the level of the economy as a whole is 
the heterogeneous knowledge structure or ‘economic knowledge’ whose differential 
character helps to explain why some economies perform better than others.  
 
In this way we may construct a picture of the entrepreneurially driven economy that is 
thoroughly Lachmannian in spirit in that it emphasizes sources of original profit such 
as complementarity and increasing returns and learning by doing that derive from 
entrepreneurial choices made in general conditions of disequilibrium. Such choices 
have no counterpart in the neoclassical world. This is a Lachmannian picture insofar 
as it is based on subjective expectations of the elements involved in entrepreneurial 
judgments as to the profit-earning potential of new combinations. It is Lachmannian 
in its insistence that the conditions of entrepreneurial success are not given, but are 
created, using the tools that are available. And it is Lachmannian in its language, 
where the emphasis must lie on verbs such as constructing, forming and building, 
rather than on discovering, finding or responding to objective data (all of which are 
important, but only a part of the story). Such a Lachmannian picture allows us to 
frame strategizing choices in terms of the direct sources of profit that are available 
from combinations and recombinations of the primary elements of business enterprise, 
namely resources (where the strategic goal is to create complementarities), activities 
(where the goal is to create and capture increasing returns) and routines (where the 
goal is to build learning effects). In this way strategizing discourse may be liberated 
from its dependence on the language of imperfect markets and imperfect equilibria, as 
in the Ricardian account of the RBV (where rents accrue to firms because of 
imperfect competition for resources) or the Porter version of the ABV where rents are 
earned by firms through imperfections in product markets.  
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Here we have three approaches to strategy as taught in the current textbooks: a 
competitive forces view, or what I am calling an Activities-based view (ABV); a 
Resources-based view (RBV); and a Dynamic capabilities perspective (DCP). The 
literature on strategic management has emphasized the differences between these 
three approaches, placing primacy either on resources (as in the RBV); or on activities 
(as in the competitive forces view) or on routines (as in the dynamic capabilities 
perspective). My concern by contrast is to emphasize their comparabilities, and in 
particular the duality (or complementarity) between resources and activities from a 
strategizing perspective. (Michael Porter calls for an integrated perspective that 
respects this duality between resources and his own competitive forces view -- which 
I am here equating to an activities view, based as it is on cost-based considerations.v) 
The key to doing so is to create a clear link between how an organization bundles its 
activities, resources and their connecting routines, with its manner of earning profit. A 
Knightian account of this process, simple as it is (leaving out of the picture, for 
example, capital gains, or contributions to profit from uninsured risks), encourages us 
to view strategizing in terms of direct entrepreneurial choices regarding resources, 
activities and routines, rather than the exploitation of market imperfections and the 
capture of rents.  
 The framework being adopted as an extension of a Lachmannian perspective, 
is summarized in Table 1. Our concern now is to utilize these fundamental categories 
of business enterprise to develop a realistic account of how entrepreneurs seek 
strategic goals in the general case of disequilibrium associated with each of the 
categories and their elaborations, and how the conventional approaches to strategy 
may be viewed as special cases (operating at imperfect equilibrium) of this general 
setting. 
 
Table 1. The elemental categories of business enterprise 
 





Resources Bundling resources in a Complementarities Heterogeneous 
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distinctive manner by 
using entrepreneurial 
imagination to form 
production plans 
capital structure 
Activities Bundling activities in a 
distinctive manner by 
implementing production 
plans to generate revenue 
Increasing returns Heterogeneous 
activities structure: 
Network of value 
chains 
Routines Bundling routines in a 
distinctive manner by 
connecting resources 












Three views on strategizing 
 
The Lachmannian framework for building a picture of the firm where entrepreneurial 
initiative results in the combining and recombining of resources, activities and 
routines, may now be utilized to generate three views of strategizing. The goal now is 
to contrast the conventional strategy picture, where firms earn rents because of market 
imperfections, with a more general disequilibrium picture where entrepreneurial 
initiative can be viewed as directly generating profits from such sources as the 
generation and capture of increasing returns. Such an approach will allow us to 
construct three views of strategizing, corresponding to the manipulation of the three 
categories of business enterprise, in a completely general (disequilibrium) setting 
which is the setting assumed in organizational discourse or the language of the 
behavioral theory of the firm. By contrast, we shall derive special cases where the 
firm is assumed to be at equilibrium, either imperfect or perfect. At imperfect 
equilibrium, where rents can be earned because of various market imperfections, we 
can derive the conventional strategic frameworks based on a Resources view and on 
competitive forces (or an Activities view). At perfect equilibrium, no such market 
imperfections exist, and all rents vanish (as indeed do profits). From such a 
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perspective, we may say that strategizing ceases to have any meaning at neoclassical 
perfect equilibrium.  
 Thus we use language from three disciplines. We use the language of 
neoclassical economics to describe the situation at the (very) special case of perfect 
equilibrium. We use the language of conventional strategy involving rents, barriers to 
entry, rarity and nonimitability of resources etc at the special case of imperfect 
equilibrium. But in the general case, where profits can be generated through 
entrepreneurial initiatives taken in disequilibrium, we use the language of 
organization studies, where the focus is on how resources may be combined in order 
to construct and capture complementarities, or activities may be combined in value 
chains to generate increasing returns, or routines may be combined and elaborated to 
generate organizational learning and dynamic capabilities. In the general 
disequilibrium case, entrepreneurs are viewed as operating with bounded rationality, 
with imperfect environmental matching or in unresolved conflict – all terms deriving 
from the behavioral theory of the firm – rather than in responding to perfectly 
identified and understood ‘facts’ (the neoclassical economics case) or to market 
imperfections (the conventional strategy case).  
In each of the three cases, linked to resources, activities and routines, we wish 
to identify a strategic goal that can guide entrepreneurial judgment in the pursuit of 
profit, in a completely general setting where no assumptions as to perfect or imperfect 
equilibrium are imposed, and where no ex ante limits on competitiveness are imposed 
– a general, disequilibrium setting. In each case, we shall contrast this general setting 
with the special case of a firm at a point of perfectly competitive equilibrium (as 
discussed in neoclassical economics) and with the firm in a region of imperfect 
equilibrium where rents can be earned (as discussed in conventional strategy). Our 
aim will be to demonstrate how the general disequilibrium case generates 
complementary insight into the real strategic behavior of entrepreneurs over and 
above the comparative static, equilibrium-based approaches that have been popular in 
strategy. The general case enables us to capture real behavior of entrepreneurs in the 
manner of the behavioral theory of the firm and recent contributions such as those 
treating behavior in disequilibrium and turbulence (Zappia 2001; Bromiley and 
Papenhausen 2003; Mathews 2006a; Selsky, Goes and Baburoglu 2007). Real 
strategizing calls for insights generated from both perspectives – the dynamic as well 
as the comparative static. 
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A generalized Resource-based view 
From the perspective of the firms’ resources, it is the possibility of constructing and 
capturing synergies through the strategic bundling of resources, based on 
complementarities, that becomes the focus of strategizing behavior aimed at the 
earning of profit in disequilibrium. The point of comparison is the standard 
formulation of the production function, where factors of production (notably capital 
and labor) are considered to be perfectly homogeneous, perfectly mobile and perfectly 
substitutable.vi  These are necessary conditions for the demonstration of a perfectly 
competitive equilibrium. But as soon as this unworldly constraint is lifted, the search 
for ways of building complementarities – as the alternative to substitutability and 
homogeneity – emerges. This is where Lachmann made his prime contribution and 
where disequilibrium emerges as the appropriate setting. 
The idea of complementarity has a long history in political economy. In static 
adjustment, complementary and substitute goods are simply understood: goods are 
held to be complements or substitutes for each other depending on their marginal 
contributions to the total product, at equilibrium. If their marginal products are 
positively related, then they are said to be complements: the one entails the other – as 
is the case when we have economies of scope. If their marginal products are 
negatively related, then they are said to be substitutes: the one precludes the other. 
The situation is analyzed at equilibrium, and it is assumed that all prices and 
combinations of inputs and outputs are known. Substitution occurs if the price of a 
given good changes; it occurs costlessly and frictionlessly. There is no attempt to 
consider the situation in disequilibrium or to consider the process of adjustment.  
 In the dynamic case, where strategizing rules, things are not nearly so simple – 
as the long debate on complementarity in the theory of capital makes clear. 
Schumpeter (1912) had discussed the entrepreneur’s role in creating ‘asset 
combinations’ – but did not go on to explore complementarity in any depth. It was 
Lachmann (1947; 1956) who first considered the problem in its generality. The point 
is that complementarities are not created automatically. They have to be found, indeed 
discovered and constructed as argued by strategy scholars such as Harrison, Hitt, 
Hoskisson and Ireland (2001). In the generalized case, entrepreneurs are combining 
and recombining resources in pursuit of profits created by complementarities. 
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 In the special case where the firm finds itself at an imperfect equilibrium, if 
there are limits imposed on competitive forces then Ricardian rents can be secured. 
The imperfection lies in the markets for resources, which can be considered as either 
incomplete or imperfect in the sense that there are restrictions on access to resources 
(i.e. the resources are scarce). The classic case is that of land, as described by Ricardo 
– hence the idea of Ricardian rents. Peteraf (1993) provides the foundations for the 
Ricardian rents approach to strategizing around resources, in imposing both ex ante 
and ex post limits to competition in order to ensure that rents can be earned at 
imperfect equilibrium. No such limits to competition are needed in the general 
disequilibrium case, where firms seek profit opportunities through constructing and 
capturing complementarities. What a pity that the RBV sought its antecedents in the 
work of Ricardo rather than in Lachmann.vii 
 
A generalized Activities-based view 
Firms have to make strategic adjustments and take competitive initiatives in terms of 
their revenue-generating activities. They are endlessly adjusting and reconfiguring 
their value chains, in response to their evaluation of their own initiatives and those of 
their competitors – which may be experienced as radical or incremental, or even 
architectural innovations, to use the language of Henderson and Clark (1990). Apart 
from lowering costs and achieving distinctiveness (e.g. through the use of Activity-
based costing), can we be more precise concerning the strategic goals that 
entrepreneurs pursue in their deployment of their firms’ activities? By contrast with 
the case of the neoclassical production function, which constrains firms to operate at 
equilibrium with constant returns to scale, we may in a strategizing perspective 
consider firms as pursuing increasing returns – which is essentially the idea that 
greater productivity is being achieved for the same inputs – through the construction 
of their activity set based on their chosen set of resources.  
 The conception of increasing returns has a long and troubled history in 
economics – as detailed by Buchanan and Yoon (1999) and by the well-known 
difficulties that Arthur (1996) had in securing publication of his work. The imposition 
of a constant returns restriction was imposed in the neoclassical framework essentially 
as an arbitrary assumption, to ensure that at equilibrium the sum of marginal products 
of each factor would ‘add up’ to the total output. But there is no reason why strategy 
should be constrained to make such arbitrary assumptions. The pursuit of increasing 
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returns is a natural setting (a dynamic concept, as compared with the static and 
technologically determined notion of ‘increasing returns to scale’) in which to frame 
the configuration and reconfiguration of their value chains of activities by firms – so 
let us pose the pursuit of increasing returns as the strategic goal involved in 
strategizing around activities. Whether it is the creation of a more dispersed value 
chain (as developed by IKEA), or a case of vertically integrating within the value 
chain, the results sought are increasing returns, as the object of the strategizing 
endeavor applied to the firm’s activities. Capitalism has grown at an extraordinary 
rate over the past two centuries precisely because firms have been able to create and 
capture increasing returns. 
In the special case of an imperfect equilibrium, as discussed to the exclusion 
of everything else in the standard accounts of strategy (the RBV and Porter variants) 
if there are limits to competition in the product markets in which the firm is active, 
then monopoly rents can be secured. In that case we may say, along with Porter, that 
the ‘competitive forces’ operating on the firm at that point are weak. Firms will 
certainly wish to find out what is the state of play regarding the competitive forces 
impinging on their cost-based activities at any point in time; this is the substance of 
the Porter approach. But they will also want to know what possibilities might exist for 
extending the range of their activities so as to create and capture increasing returns 
that are available only with the passage of time and through commitments that must 
be made today but which will reap rewards in the future. The generalized case handles 
strategizing over time, when firms need to make decisions as to when to ramp up their 
activities and when to ramp them down – as in cyclical industries (Mathews 2005). 
The possibilities of generating and capturing increasing returns, as defined in the 
general disequilibrium case, are reduced to zero as the firm approaches the imperfect 
equilibrium where the profits secured amount to monopoly rents.  
 
A generalized dynamic capabilities perspective 
Finally there is the issue of the firm’s routines, which are created by management as a 
link between the current activities and resources. Strategizing around the 
configuration of routines by the firm is to be equated with the strategic goal of 
building dynamic capabilities embodied in organizational learning at different levels. 
In a word, strategizing by entrepreneurs around their firms’ routines involves them in 
moving down the ‘organizational learning curve’ (Epple, Argote and Devadas 1991)or 
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the ‘experience curve’ or ‘learning by doing’ – a wonderful phrase, popularized by the 
Boston Consulting Group, that conveys the action orientation of an entrepreneurial 
approach to strategizing. It says that learning only comes through engaging in 
ventures; it is another form of creative discovery. Note that within the neoclassical 
production function, there is no ‘learning’ at all, since it is assumed that the firm is 
always acting at the optimal point on its production frontier.  
 Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997) term their view a ‘dynamic capabilities 
perspective’ (DCP) precisely to differentiate it from the somewhat static approach 
taken in the conventional RBV and Porter view. The DCP is concerned above all with 
how firms’ capabilities are fashioned, and adapted to changing economic 
circumstances – as in the exemplary cases like Intel’s adaptive responses (Burgelman 
2002). The DCP makes no obvious appeal to economic equilibrium-based 
assumptions; nor is it comparative static in its formulation, unlike the conventional 
RBV and Porter view (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000).viii But then again, it is not 
immediately clear what is the strategic goal of firms when viewed from the DCP, 
other than to enhance their capabilities. The generalized case by contrast makes clear 
that the goal is the improvement of managerial routines (by testing, measurement and 
evaluation) so as to create ever broader and deeper organizational capabilities. And 
because the general case handles all possible irregularities and forms of competition, 
there is no need for any special category of ‘hyper’-competition (Selsky, Goes and 
Baburoglu 2007). 
 
Strategizing in the general case 
Thus we have a picture of the entrepreneurial firm pursuing profits through creation of 
strategic opportunities and adjustment of its bundle of resources, activities and 
routines. Associated with this is a picture of the economy as a dynamic aggregate of 
resources, activities and routines, captured by Lachmann’s original idea of a 
heterogeneous capital structure and extended by the constructs of the economy as 
heterogeneous activities structure (intersecting value chains) and heterogeneous 
knowledge structure, embodying various kinds of capabilities. By contrast with the 
vision painted by the neoclassical production function, with its emphasis on costless 
adjustment of perfectly substitutable factors of production in pursuit of 
technologically determined marginal revenues and marginal costs, this Lachmannian 
perspective views the entrepreneur as strategically adjusting the firm’s bundle of 
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resources, activities and routines, in response to shocks received from the business 
system, or in pursuit of creatively generated strategic opportunities. The strategic 
goals that we can associate with each of the categories considered are the construction 
and capture of complementarities from the resource bundle; the generation of 
increasing returns from the activities bundle; and the creation and capture of learning 
effects (or building of capabilities) from the bundle of routines. These are all strategic 
goals that can not be reduced to any economic variable at equilibrium; the profits 
derived from them approach zero as the firm’s operating position approaches a 
(fictional) point of equilibrium.  
How then can strategizing behavior be captured in terms of our three 
elemental categories, to bring our picture closer to managerial reality? We suppose 
that the entrepreneur starts with simple resources, and builds these, through 
combination and recombination, into a firm consisting of more complex resource 
bundles, the valuation of which becomes increasingly more problematic, not only for 
the firm itself but especially for other firms (causal ambiguity). It is this gap between 
the valuation possibilities available for the firm that possesses the complex resources 
(and its knowledge of the sets of activities that are possible with such a set of 
resources), and the possibilities available for other firms lacking such inside 
knowledge, that constitutes the ultimate source of positive NPVs, or positive profits.  
Thus in an economy without firms, i.e. an economy of sole traders, the only 
profits obtainable would be through arbitrage (dependent on information 
asymmetries). But in an economy with firms, profits can be generated through the 
complexity of firms themselves, and their resource-activity bundles; the knowledge 
available to the entrepreneur regarding the firm’s resources and the real options they 
represent (Kogut and Kulatilaka 2001) over present and future activities, is not 
available through the market to others (Lewin and Phelan 1999; Denrell, Fang and 
Winter 2003; Foss and Ishikawa 2007). It is firms themselves, and their organizational 
structure (their internal valuation procedures over resource complexes), that constitute 
the ultimate source of an entrepreneurial residual, namely profit – rather than the 
market imperfections focused on in conventional strategy, and the temporary profits 
allowed in neoclassical economics before a putative equilibrium is reached.  
In the general framework, there is no need to assume that strategic 
opportunities arise solely from imperfections in strategic factor markets (Barney 
1986) nor that ex ante or ex post limits are needed in competition (Peteraf 1993) nor 
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that a strategic opportunity exists only when prices fail to reflect the value of a 
resource’s best use – as argued by Denrell, Fang and Winter (2003). In a 
disequilibrium setting, it is sufficient to assume that such an opportunity exists 
whenever an entrepreneur finds resources priced in such a way that the firm can 
utilize them more efficiently than the market at that price – without necessarily 
having to discover the optimal use of the resources. I see strategic opportunity as 
being equated with the discovery of an entrepreneurial opportunity where a mismatch 
between prices and values (as seen from the perspective of the firm with its 
idiosyncratic bundle of resources) leads to the formulation of a business project that 
will actually test whether the opportunity is real or not. The entrepreneur has no need 
to know – and indeed cannot know – whether the firm’s business project will make 
optimal use of the resources. All the entrepreneur needs to know is that he or she can 
impute a value to the resources, because of the firm’s existing resource combination, 
that is different from the value given by current prices. If we press the argument, an 
entrepreneur will have discovered the optimal use of a firm’s resources only at a point 
of perfectly competitive equilibrium, where everything is used to its maximal 
efficiency, and all profits are reduced to zero. At such a point, strategizing in any 
meaningful sense, must have ceased.   
The drive behind entrepreneurs’ search for positions for their firm in 
disequilibrium where positive profits can be earned, through new kinds of activities, 
or new combinations of resources, or new combinations of routines, is spurred by 
competition. Innovations are introduced, in terms of new combinations of activities, 
resources or routines, resulting in the displacement of incumbents (or what 
Schumpeter (1912; 2002) called ‘creative destruction’ in the economy as a whole) and 
the drive behind innovation that constitutes capitalism’s raison d’etre (Baumol 2002). 
New successful positions will attract imitators, and the whittling away of such profits 
(Augier and Teece 2008). The time-path of profits thus becomes a central feature of 
strategic industrial dynamics (Jacobson and Hansen 2001). It is the imitability of 
resources, activities and routines as well as their innovative creation that ultimately 
drives competition in an open economy, opening the way to entrepreneurial 
construction of alternatives. This is why we must work with definitions of these 
categories that allow them to be sourced externally as well as built internally, and why 
entrepreneurship itself must be held categorically distinct from the resources, 
activities and routines that are manipulated by entrepreneurial initiative. 
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Concluding comments: Overcoming the balkanization of 
management 
 
Donald Hambrick expresses the management teaching dilemma well when he writes: 
‘What an irony. Strategic management, the field that documented the virtues of core 
competences, relatedness and dominant logic, is on the verge of losing any semblance 
of those qualities in its own intellectual affairs … Like a supernova that once packed a 
wallop, our energy is now dissipating and we are quickly growing cold. … Granted 
the natural tendency is for an academic field to drift toward specialization, and even 
specializations, as it matures and accumulates a body of knowledge. But this does not 
mean that it must lose its core underpinnings, as has happened – and is increasingly 
happening – in the field of strategic management’ (Hambrick 2004: 91).  
 Is there a way out of the disintegration of strategic management, and 
management and organizational thinking generally, alluded to so forcefully by 
Hambrick? In this article, I have offered a simple way forward, with a view to 
focusing on the core, elementary, strategic categories of management and 
organization, and seeing whether we can build a workable model of the business 
enterprise out of them, and an approach to strategic thinking that differentiates it from 
its antecedents in economic thinking. In fields such as marketing and supply chain 
management, an approach based on entrepreneurial decisions taken in general 
conditions of uncertainty and in settings of disequilibrium, involving the general 
categories of resources, activities and routines, provide more realistic accounts than 
those based on neoclassical economics reasoning (e.g. firms should develop pricing 
routines equating prices to marginal costs) or on conventional strategy approaches 
(e.g. supply chain portfolio management). If the same approach is taken to all other 
management tasks, including HRM, financial management, operations management 
etc then we have at least the beginnings of a coherent foundation that can unify 
teaching, or at least make it consistent, rather than balkanize it as at present. Moreover, 
such an approach is specific to management and organization as a discipline, and can 
be seen to owe nothing to equilibrium-based economics.  
 This article is directed to an organizational, entrepreneurial and strategy 
audience, in defence of the proposition that organization and strategy – and in 
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particular the emerging field of strategic entrepreneurship – would benefit from an 
approach that differentiates the field clearly and unambiguously from economic 
reasoning, on the one hand, and from conventional strategy on the other. My aim has 
been to demonstrate that it is possible to take Lachmann and other Austrian theorists 
seriously, not only in their own terms as applied to disequilibrium accounts of 
economics – as in market process theory and entrepreneurial dynamics -- but also (and 
possibly more significantly) as guides to the formulation of a consistently 
disequilibrium-based approach to entrepreneurial strategizing. In this latter activity 
the focus can be firmly on the processes of creatively recombining business elements 
and  dynamically adjusting to new circumstances through which firms win profits -- 
rather than collecting rents through presumed imperfections in product markets or 
factor markets (Mathews 2006b).  
The article suggests an alternative starting point for strategizing, based on 
Lachmannian and Austrian insights, where we take categories that are under direct 
management and entrepreneurial control – namely resources, activities and their 
connecting routines – and ask how profits might be earned by firms through 
reconfiguring these categories in the general case of disequilibrium. In so doing, we 
generate a framework that can yield a resource-based view, as well as an activities-
based view and a routines-based view (or dynamic capabilities perspective) of 
strategizing, all considered in their general, disequilibrium setting, as well as in the 
special cases involving more restrictive settings at imperfect equilibrium where rents 
may be earned. Thus the framework is able to capture the insights of the standard 
RBV and the Porter frameworks as special cases of the more general case that holds in 
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i  Equilibrium is here used in the sense of a (fictional) point in economic space where markets 
for commodities and factors are cleared; this is the standard meaning in economics. It carries no 
implication that equilibrium is a ‘natural’ resting place for an economy to reach, as in a ‘well’ that 
describes equilibrium in a thermodynamic system. A different sense of equilibrium is employed in the 
evolutionary sciences, where equilibrium can refer to a stable relationship between species within a 
given environment, and where such an equilibrium can last for a very long time. McKelvey (2004) 
provides an overview from a strategy and entrepreneurial perspective. 
 
ii  Bianchi and Henrekson settle on a definition of entrepreneurship  as “the ability and 
willingness of individuals, both on their own and within organizations to: (1) innovate, i.e. perceive and 
create new economic opportunities; (ii) face uncertainty, i.e. introduce their ideas in the market, by 
making decisions on location, form and the use of resources and institutions; and (iii) manage their 
business by competing with others for a share of that market” (2005: 355). 
 
iii  The neoclassical tradition almost completely ignores entrepreneurial activity (Bianchi and 
Henrekson 2005) or mis-categorizes it as a choice between clear alternatives. Where entrepreneurship 
is discussed in this tradition, it is in narrow functional terms, and in general equilibrium settings, by 
authors such as Evans and Jovanovic (1989), where returns to a highly stylized characterization of the 
entrepreneur are envisaged. 
 
iv  Lachmann also draws attention to capital substitution and reshuffling of capital goods at the 
firm level, all viewed as part of the process of restructuring of capital. I place less emphasis on this 
aspect of construction of capital structure because it is more likely to be associated with a strategy of 
imitation rather than of original profit creation. 
 
v  See the interview with Porter in Argyres and McGahan (2002) for an elaboration of the dual 
perspective. 
 
vi  The production function as utilized in economics is a construct that stipulates output in terms 
of factor inputs (usually land, capital and labor). All the contractual and strategic issues involved in 
building firms are assumed away in such a construct. Economists’ graphical depictions of firms’ total 
output, marginal output etc only make sense in a world of certainty, where objective values can be 
placed on these constructs.  A subjectivist approach suitable for framing strategic choices needs to 
dispense with such an assumption. 
 
vii  In Lachmann’s last book, The Market as an Economic Process, he states his position very 
clearly: “We suggest … that the notion of capital combination be used as our fundamental concept. 
Each capital combination is handled by a firm, acting as our unit agent within the framework of its plan 
… We shall think of it as typically composed of land, buildings, fixed and working capital as well as 
sums of money and financial assets…The composition of a capital combination cannot be chosen at 
random. Only certain forms of it can produce output streams, only some of these can be profitably 
produced. Technological and market constraints circumscribe feasible modes of complementarity of the 
various elements” (1986: 63). On the next page he notes that capital structure arises from the constant 
interaction between firms and their conflicting plans, and is thus “always in disequilibrium” (1986: 64). 
 
viii  The DCP certainly comes out of the evolutionary/Variation-Selection-Retention way of 
thinking, which McKelvey (2004) insists is equilibrium-based. But this is equilibrium in an 
evolutionary sense, rather than in the sense used in neoclassical economics. Augier and Teece (2008) 
clarify the evolutionary origins of DCP thinking, and formulate the insight that strategy from this 
perspective can be considered ‘evolution with design’ – as opposed to evolution via blind variation and 
selection. 
 
 
